I'm still trying to develop a personal opinion on how I feel about Judges who engage in so-called "legislating from the bench." Of course, this is a phrase which has become quite popular among conservative groups in reference to recent court opinions that have "fabricated" rights to activities such as abortion, gay sex, and gay marriage. Another favorite name-calling device you might have heard is "activist judges."
Unfortunately, most of the think-tanks and political pundits quoted in newspapers and magazines have a very limited understanding of what they're even talking about when it comes to courts, judges, and the law. Nevertheless, I have read a few "activist" cases this week that might have been fit for the editorial pages of the Washington Post, rather than the legally enforceable pages of a court reporter.
Lawrence v. Texas, decided just a few years go, involved a statute in Texas which made it illegal only for homosexuals (not heterosexuals) to engage in sodomy. Such a disparity in the law which is blatantly intended to limit a certain "class" of people is in direct conflict with the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, and therefore could have easily been disposed of by the Supreme Court on this basis.
Instead, the Court, lead by Justice Kennedy, chose to ignore the easy argument against this statute, and instead launch into a discussion of a broad right-to-privacy and how it gave people the freedom to engage in whatever sexual acts they please in their own homes. Problem is, there is no "right to privacy" spelled out in the Constitution. Sure, there are plenty of ways to argue that the Constitution should or might contain words which imply a right-to-privacy, but such reasoning relies on tenuous and very controversial legal justification. The Court, understanding this problem, declined to set out a "fundamental right" to engaging in sexual acts.
I'm not going to waste time on the right-to-privacy debate in this post. My main point is that the Court could have attacked the Texas statute with a number of very sound legal arguments, but chose instead to editorialize or "legislate" from the bench. Rather than respond to the very specific issue of the case, the Court wrote an exposition on what it thought about gay sex.
Commentators who disdain this sort of judicial "activism" often use Justice Scalia and his "originalist" thinking as an example of how judges should act. But a Civil Procedure case we read today, Burnham v. Superior Court, highlighted the problems with this very narrow approach as well. "Originalist" legal theorists, such as Scalia, believe that laws should be interpreted in an exclusively historical and traditional context. In other words, Scalia doesn't like judges who start make things up in their legal opinions. In his dissent in Lawrence, besides exposing a disturbing level of homophobia, Scalia tiraded about the legally bankrupt reasoning of the majority's opinion. Despite his politics, Scalia was right on that point. But "originalism" can lead to very confusing and impractical results as well. The "originalist" theory often refuses to let the law bend and change to fit contemporary norms and societal changes over time.
This discussion only scratches the surface of the importance of this debate between "activism" and "originalism." Lawrence would make most people think that "originalism" is practically inept at dealing with real problems that come before the Court. But not all cases are this obvious. More on this soon...
By the way, Harriet Miers is a complete joke. More on that soon as well...
Recent Comments